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I. INTRODUCTION
The bumbling criminal has long been humorous to the law-
abiding. Take, for example, a man recently intent on robbing a
bank. The man entered a Bank of America bank, grabbed a deposit
1869
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slip, and wrote on it "This iz a stikkup. Put all your muny in this
bag."'i While waiting in line for a teller, he became worried that
someone had seen him write the note and would inform the police.
2
Thus, he exited the bank, walked across the street to the Wells
Fargo bank, and gave the note to a teller.3 The teller, probably
sensing his lack of dangerousness from the note, informed him that
she could not comply because the note was on a Bank of America
deposit slip, not a Wells Fargo slip. 4 He then returned to the other
bank and began to wait in line.5 The Wells Fargo teller called the
police and the man was arrested while waiting in line at the Bank
of America.'
Many may wonder whether this man had enough wits to be a
successful criminal. In general, however, this concern is irrelevant
to the law. As long as he had an intent to commit the crime, and
acted on that intent, he is culpable, and therefore punishable.
There are rare cases, however, where unsuccessful defendants are
exonerated. Consider for example a witch doctor who intends to
commit murder with a voodoo doll; or an individual who tries to
sink a battleship with a BB gun. In such cases, few would argue
that prosecution for attempted murder or attempted battleship
sinking is appropriate. Although these hypotheticals push the
limits of possibility, they highlight the question of whether criminal
inability may ever be grounds for exculpation.
This question was raised in United States v. Hollingsworth, a
recent entrapment case where two defendants willingly acquiesced
to a government agent's directions to launder money.7 The Seventh
Circuit reversed the defendants' conviction because the court found
them to be "foolish" men who had "no prayer of becoming money
launderers without the government's aid."' The court reasoned
that, because the defendants had no "underworld contacts, financial
acumen or... access to foreign banks," which were needed to
commit the crime, they were "objectively harmless."' Thus, the







7. See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
8. Id. at 1202.
9. Id.
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Seventh Circuit held that, in entrapment cases, one's inability to
independently commit the crime in question is, in some cases, a
legitimate defense. ° The Seventh Circuit's analysis has come to be
known as the "positional predisposition" inquiry because it at-
tempts to discern whether the defendant was in the position to
commit the crime before being contacted by the government."
While some commentators have supported the Hollingsworth
approach,12 the Fifth Circuit recently became the third federal
appeals court to reject the Hollingsworth approach. 13  This Note
10. See id. at 1200 ("[To be convicted,] [t]he defendant must be so situated by reason of
previous training or experience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the
government had not induced him to commit the crime some criminal would have done so....").
There is generous debate on the exact holding of Hollingsworth. See Kenneth M. Lord,
Entrapment and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System of Defenses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
463, 490 (1998) (arguing that the proper inquiry regarding criminal ability is "whether the
defendant subjectively perceived herself to have the ability to commit the crime at the time of the
government's inducement"); Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, the
Entrapment Defense, 47 FL4. L. REV. 205, 232-33 (1995) (supporting the Hollingsworth holding
because "criminal punishment is not to be for a guilty mind, but only for a guilty action or at
least a probability of such an action"); Lori J. Rankin, Casenote, Entrapment: A Defense for the
Willing, Yet Unready, Criminal?, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1487, 1515-16 (1995) (arguing that "[t]he
Hollingsworth majority's misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent... allow[s] a defendant
to prevail on an entrapment defense despite the defendant's willingness to commit a crime");
Elliot Rothstein, Note, United States v. Hollingsworth: The Entrapment Defense and the
Neophyte Criminal-When the Commission of a Criminal Act Does Not Constitute a Crime, 17 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 330 (1995) (arguing that the Hollingsworth rule is improper because it
"will permit clever defendants to use the guise of stupidity or naivet6 as a defense to their
crime," which would "contravene both American criminal jurisprudence and our societal goal of
punishing the blameworthy).
11. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200 ("redisposition is not a purely mental state, the
state of being willing to swallow the government's bait. It has positional as well as dispositional
force.") (emphasis added).
12. See Thomas G. Briody, The Government Made Me Do It-The Changing Landscape
on the Law of Entrapment, 45 R.I.B.J., Mar. 1997, at 15, 17; Marcus, supra note 10, at 232-33;
Catherine A. Schultz, Comment, Victim or the Crime?: The Government's Burden in Proving
Predisposition in Federal Entrapment Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 949, 977-81 (1999). Some
commentators have supported the Hollingsworth holding while still criticizing its reasoning. See
Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 428-30 (1999)
(arguing the Hollingsworth holding was correct, but "not for the reason given by Chief Judge
Posner").
13. See United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247, 260 (5th Cir. 1998) ("In fact, the law of our
circuit is at least arguably contra to the holding in Hollingsworth."); United States v. Thickstun,
110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[O]ur reading [of Jacobson v. United States] conflicts with
that of the Seventh Circuit in Hollingsworth.... Having concluded that Jacobson does not
require 'positional' predisposition, we decline to adopt such a requirement. A person's ability to
commit a crime may illustrate her predisposition to do so, but should not become a separate
element to be proven."); United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Although we
have consistently approved the phrase 'ready and willing' as an appropriate definition of the
requisite predisposition, we have never distinguished 'readiness' from 'willingness.'") (citation
omitted).
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seeks to resolve the debate over the positional predisposition
inquiry.
Entrapment cases typically involve undercover police tactics
that are necessary to detect so-called "consensual crimes."'14 These
crimes, such as prostitution or drug use, are difficult to detect
without covert tactics because neither party to the crime is likely to
report it. s Increased criminalization of consensual behavior, which
was common in the early twentieth century, increases the preva-
lence and sophistication of police undercover tactics, creating a risk
that previously innocent individuals will become trapped into a
crime. 16 In response to this risk, the judiciary created the defense of
entrapment.
7
As promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1932, the entrap-
ment defense involves a simple two-part evaluation.'s First, the
defendant asserting the defense must show that the government
induced her to commit the crime.19 A successful showing of induce-
ment shifts the burden to the prosecution to show that, despite the
government inducement, the defendant was nonetheless predis-
posed to commit the crime.20 Because a showing of inducement
requires a relatively low threshold of evidence, 2" the majority of
14. Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 164 (1976); see also
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (stating that undercover police work is "one of
the only practical means of detecti[ng drug-related offenses]").
15. See Park, supra note 14, at 164.
16. As one commentator has noted:
The cause of [entrapment techniques] was basically the nature of the crimes .... Amer-
ica in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the coming of Com-
stockery, the Mann Act, The Harrison Drug Act, Prohibition and sumptuary legislation
generally to a degree unheard of at common law .... The significance of all these new
crimes is their inadaptability to a prosecutory scheme based on private complaint ....
Consequently the creation of these new offenses brought unaccustomed difficulties of en-
forcement in the attempt to discover the existence of criminal activity ....
Michael A. DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and
Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 243, 250-51 (1967).
17. See id.
18. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932) ("[T]he defense of entrapment
is not simply that the particular act was committed at the instance of government offi-
cials.... The predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are [also] relevant.").
19. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-549 (1992); see also Mathews v.
United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988) ("[A] valid entrapment defense has two related
elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the
defendant to engage in the criminal conduct.").
20. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549.
21. See Lord, supra note 10, at 474 (stating that the showing of inducement "is usually a
fairly easy burden for the defendant to meet); see also PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT
DEFENSE § 2.04, at 57 (2d ed. 1995) ("In many cases, of course, there is little difficulty in proving
inducement....").
1872
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debate in entrapment cases centers on whether the defendant was
predisposed. = Generally, predisposition has been understood solely
as a mental state,n divined through an analysis of the "totality of
the circumstances. ' ' The Seventh Circuit's predisposition inquiry
in Hollingsworth was novel because, besides taking account of the
defendants' mental states, it took account of their mental and
physical abilities as well.n
The solution to the positional predisposition dispute requires
answering two questions. First, on what grounds should criminal
ability be considered at all by a court in determining a defendant's
predisposition? Second, if ability is probative of predisposition,
what degree of inability should be required for exculpation? This
Note argues that a defendant's criminal ability is probative of that
defendant's predisposition, and further, that a defendant's inability
should be exculpatory to the degree that exculpation would be
appropriate in cases of impossibility under criminal attempt law.
Part II of this Note provides the setting. It reviews the facts
and judicial opinion of the most well-known positional predisposi-
tion case, United States v. Hollingsworth. Then, Part III demon-
strates the logic behind exculpating defendants for their inability.
In summary, Part III reasons that, because the entrapment
defense's purpose is to determine the culpability of the defendant,
the defendant's criminal ability should be considered since it is
22. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (stating that the principle element in
the defense of entrapment is the defendants predisposition); United States v. Resnick, 745 F.2d
1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that the principle element in the defense of entrapment is the
defendant's predisposition); see also MARCUS, supra note 21, § 2.05, at 60 ('The major issue
under the subjective test is predisposition.").
23. See United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Predisposition is
necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry because it is a subjective inquiry into a defendant's state of
mind."); United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[P]redisposition is, 'by
definition 'the defendant's state of mind and inclinations before his initial exposure to
government agents.'"); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir. 1983)
("[P]redisposition refers to the state of mind of a defendant before government agents make any
suggestion that he should commit a crime.").
24. State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Tenn. 1980) ("A finding of predisposition should
be based on the totality of the circumstances."). See also MARCUS, supra note 21, § 4.12, at 135
(' Most trial courts look to all relevant facts in determining predisposition.").
25. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit reasoned
The point is not that [the defendants] were incapable of engaging in the act of money
laundering. Obviously they were capable of the act. All that was involved in the act was
wiring money to a bank account designated by the government agent. Anyone can wire
money. But to get into the international money-laundering business you need under-
world contacts, financial acumen or assets, access to foreign banks or bankers, or other
assets. [The defendants] had none.
United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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probative of culpability. Part IV then addresses the concern that
exculpation for all criminal inability may be too broad, since
attempt law, in general, punishes unable defendants. Thus, Part
IV argues that exculpation for criminal inability should be permit-
ted only to the extent that such exculpation is permitted in cases of
impossible criminal attempts. As will be demonstrated in Part IV,
only a small category of impossible attempts, inherently impossible
attempts, warrant a dismissal of criminal liability. Part V serves
as a conclusion.
II. THE SETTING FOR AN ISSUE OF POSITIONAL PREDISPOSITION
In 1988, Hollingsworth and his friend, Pickard, had aspira-
tions of wealth; they wanted to start a bank. Six years later, their
fate was before the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc. Nothing short
of a fundamental change in entrapment law would provide for their
release. Nonetheless, by a margin of just one vote, the Seventh
Circuit created a new requirement for federal prosecutors in cases
where government agents have induced the commission of a crime:
prosecutors must show that the defendant was "so situated by
reason of previous training or experience or occupation or acquain-
tances that it is likely that if the government had not induced [the
defendant] to commit the crime some criminal would have done
so . . .
Hollingsworth was a farmer from Arkansas.27 His friend,
Pickard, was an orthodontist from the same state.2 1 After attempt-
ing other legitimate schemes at making money, the two fell upon
the idea of an international bank incorporated in the Virgin
Islands." With $400,000 pooled between them, the two formed the
bank, apparently unaware of the challenges and temptations that
lay ahead."°
Their lack of experience soon caught up with them. By May
1990, their "bank" had few, if any, customers, and was losing money
at a rapid rate.31 Thus, in order to raise some capital, they offered
their "Class A" international banking license for sale via the








classified ads in USA Today.32 On that very day, J. Thomas
Rothrock, a U.S. Customs Agent, was attending a seminar on
money laundering.3 He noticed the advertisement and, newly
aware that such licenses were sometimes used to launder money,
decided to test the waters.u He called the phone number listed in
the paper and left a message, identifying himself as 'Tom Hinch."3
When Pickard returned the phone call, Rothrock told him that he
had a large quantity of cash that he needed to have deposited.3
Pickard responded positively, advising Rothrock that he could take
care of his cash by depositing it outside the United States, or by
breaking up the large sums into smaller amounts.3 7 Subsequent to
this conversation, Pickard contacted Rothrock and explained to him
that he could "clean and polish'' 3 his money by putting it "into the
banking system [so as to] ... conceal the source of where the funds
were coming from."39 After these initial contacts, the communica-
tion between the two took a reprieve until February 1991.40
In February, Rothrock contacted Pickard again and arranged
to meet with him in St. Louis, Missouri.41 At the meeting, Rothrock
told Pickard and Hollingsworth that the money in question was the
result of a gun smuggling ring in South Africa.42 Rothrock added
that "he had wished he never got his 'hands dirty,"' to which
Pickard responded "'I didn't even hear you say [that].' "43 In April
1991, the first transaction was consummated in Indianapolis, where
Pickard had his broker wire $20,000 into Rothrock's account in
exchange for $20,000 cash." Over the next five months, Pickard
and Hollingsworth performed four similar transactions, totaling
$415,000.45 After the final transaction, the two Arkansas money
launderers were arrested.
32. See id. at 1207 n.4.
33. See id. at 1200.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1200-01.
37. See id. at 1201.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1207 (original emphasis omitted).
40. See id. at 1201.
41. See i.
42. See id. at 1208.
43. Id. (alteration in original) (original emphasis omitted).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1209.
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After being convicted at trial, the two appealed, asserting
that they were entrapped as a matter of law.46 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the conviction,'4 but then agreed to rehear the case en
banc. After this second hearing, a strongly divided court again
reversed Pickard and Hollingsworth's convictions, finding that they
were not predisposed to commit their crime.48
Speaking through Judge Posner, the majority reasoned that
the defendants, though very willing to launder money, were not
predisposed because "[p]redisposition is not a purely mental state,
the state of being willing to swallow the government's bait. It has
positional as well as dispositional force."'49 Finding that Pickard and
Hollingsworth were nothing but two "tyros" with whom no self-
respecting criminal would deal, the court overturned their convic-
tions.wo
Although predisposition to commit a crime has generally
been understood as a mental state, the majority claimed that the
Supreme Court's clarification of "predisposition" in Jacobson v.
United States51 justified its unique analysis of criminal ability.2
The majority asserted that, because the defendant in Jacobson was
exonerated despite being willing to commit the crime, willingness
obviously is not wholly determinative of predisposition. 53 Rather,
the appropriate test for determining predisposition, the majority
argued, was enunciated in the final lines of the Jacobson opinion:
an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices,
likely would have never run afoul of the law [is not predisposed].' "54
Besides disagreeing that Pickard and Hollingsworth were too
inept to independently commit the crime, 5 the minority also took
issue with the majority's interpretation of Jacobson. Jacobson did
not stand, asserted Judge Ripple in dissent, for the proposition
"that the defendant [need have] sufficient aptitude and equipment
46. See id. at 1198.
47. See United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1993).
48. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1203.
49. Id. at 1200.
50. Id. at 1202.
51. 503 U.S. 540, 550-53 (1992).
52. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198-1200.
53. See id. at 1199.
54. Id. (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54).
55. See id. at 1206 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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to commit the crime.",% Rather, Jacobson only held that the
defendant need be predisposed prior to initial government contact.5
Thus, the controversy between the majority and minority
boils down to the meaning of "predisposition." While each side in
Hollingsworth attempted to defend its argument using the text of
Jacobson, each attempt is limited to little more than conjecture
because the Jacobson Court did not face an issue of positional
predisposition. Rather, a clearer answer to the debate lies in
analogizing the positional predisposition inquiry to settled doctrine
in criminal law.
III. THE LOGIC OF EXCULPATION FOR INABILITY
In an entrapment case, the court's chief purpose is to weigh
the culpability of the defendant.s Culpability in criminal law is
determined through an analysis of the defendant's mens rea and
actus reus.59 The actus reus principle holds that individuals who
have not acted are not culpable, no matter how nefarious their
intentions were.6 This section will discuss the purpose of the
entrapment defense, the varied nature of the predisposition
inquiry, and the actus reus component of criminal law. Following
this discussion, this section concludes that criminal ability is
probative of criminal predisposition because individuals who cannot
act to commit a crime are per se not culpable.61
56. Id. at 1217 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1216; see also id. at 1206 (Coffey, J., dissenting):
The Supreme Court says nothing in Jacobson about the defendant not being in the posi-
tion to commit the criminal act. Jacobson is significant not because it limits the poten-
tial targets of government sting operations to non-law-abiding citizens, but because it
limits the measures which the government may take in attempting to induce an other-
wise law-abiding citizen to violate the law....
58. See MARCUS, supra note 21, § 2.01, at 53 ("[T]he attention of the [Supreme Court's]
subjective test is principally on the defendant: what he thought and how he reacted to the
criminal opportunity.") (footnote omitted).
59. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 24, at 175 (1972).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Muzii, 676 F.2d 919, 920 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The reach of the
criminal law has long been limited by the principle that no one is punishable for his thoughts.");
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 25, at 177 ("Sad thoughts alone cannot constitute a
crime .... ").
61. This assertion uses "act" in the strictest sense, i.e. a defendant who cannot "act'
cannot physically advance towards the completion of the crime. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (1923) (arguing that to be an act, the movement "must be willed");
Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 647
(1917) (stating that an act is a "muscular movement that is willed") (original emphasis omitted).
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A. The Purpose of the Entrapment Defense
From the Supreme Court's first case on entrapment to the
present day, a disagreement has existed over the purpose of the
entrapment defense.62 Throughout the debate, a majority of justices
has consistently concluded that the purpose of the entrapment
defense is to ensure that the "unwary innocent" are not punished
along with the truly culpable.63 Seen in this way, the entrapment
defense operates as a sorting mechanism: it sorts the culpable from
the nonculpable, punishing the former and exonerating the latter.
Contrary to this, many jurists, legislators, and commentators
have argued instead that the purpose of the defense is to protect
citizens from "impermissible police conduct." Advocates of this
position argue that, similar to the logic behind the exclusionary
rule, overbearing police conduct will be deterred if convictions are
denied for otherwise criminal activity.65
In order to fully understand the entrapment defense and its
purpose, it is necessary to discuss the evolution of the defense. In
the 1932 case Sorrells v. United States, the Supreme Court promul-
gated the entrapment defense.6 There, a prohibition officer
approached the defendant, Sorrells, with a request for liquor, but
Sorrells declined to assist the officer, stating that he "'did not fool
Part IV of this Note determines the liability of defendants who can partially act towards the
completion of a crime.
62. See MARCUS, supra note 21, § 1.06, at 15 (noting the tensions among jurists over the
purpose of the entrapment defense).
63. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). Since the inception of the
defense, the Supreme Court has heard six cases on the entrapment defense, deciding in each that
the entrapment defense should focus on the defendants "predisposition" to commit the crime.
See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58
(1988); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973); Sherman, 356 U.S. 369; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
64. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For courts, legislatures, and
commentators who favor an approach that focuses on police conduct, see infra notes 99-101.
65. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 430; Commonwealth v. Tracey, 624 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Mass.
1993) ('CThe main purpose of allowing [the entrapment] defense is deterrence of the undesirable
manufacturing of crime by law enforcement officials.").
66. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Prior to Sorrells, American courts often reasoned, like the
English courts, that "a crime was a crime, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its
commission." MARCUS, supra note 21, § 1.03, at 6. Using similar righteousness, an early New
York court invoked the Bible as authority, noting that the entrapment defense first was used in
"Paradise," where the defendant claimed " The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.'" The court
went on to reason that this "defence was overruled by the great Lawgiver" and "under any code
of civilized, not to say christian ethics, it never will [be accepted]." Board of Comm'rs of Excise v.
Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864). Gradually though, as undercover police tactics changed, the
entrapment defense gained favor. See supra note 16.
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with whiskey.' "67 Later that same day the officer repeated his
request, whereupon Sorrells again refused to offer assistance.6 The
officer remained with the defendant and turned the conversation to
the First World War where, coincidentally, both had served in the
same military unit.6 After a period of reminiscing, the officer asked
Sorrells a third time for some liquor,"O at which point Sorrells left to
"'go and see if he could get a half gallon of liquor.' "71 When he
returned with some liquor, he was arrested.-
The challenge for the Court in Sorrells was to justify re-
versing the conviction of a defendant who had, by his own admis-
sion, committed the very act that federal law prohibited: the sale of
liquor. 73 While eight of nine justices agreed that Sorrells should be
exonerated, the Court divided on the proper justification. The
majority favored exonerating Sorrells because he was not "predis-
posed" to commit the crime,7' while the concurring justices favored
exoneration based on the overbearing police tactics.75 The major-
ity's approach later became known as the "subjective approach"
because it focused on the subjective characteristics of the defen-
dant. The minority approach became known as the "objective
approach" because it utilized an objective review of police conduct.
A more detailed analysis of each approach will now be undertaken.
67. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 440.
68. See id. at 439-40.
69. See id.
70. Sorrells asserted through witnesses that the agent requested liquor "probably five
times." Id. at 440.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 439-40.
73. In considering this dilemma, the Supreme Court commented:
The argument, from the standpoint of principle, is that the court is called upon to try the
accused for a particular offense which is defined by statute and that, if the evidence
shows that this offense has knowingly been committed, it matters not that its commis-
sion was induced by officers of the Government in the manner and circumstances as-
sumed. It is said that where one intentionally does an act in circumstances known to
him, and the particular conduct is forbidden by the law in those circumstances, he inten-
tionally breaks the law in the cnly sense in which the law considers intent.
Id. at 445.
74. See id. at 441 ("Mhe act for which [the] defendant was prosecuted was instigated by
the prohibition agent... [The] defendant had no previous disposition to commit it...
75. Justice Roberts, in his concurrence, opined that:
There is common agreement that where a law officer envisages a crime, plans it, and ac-
tivates its commission by one not theretofore intending its perpetration, for the sole pur-
pose of obtaining a victim through indictment, conviction and sentence, the consumma-
tion of so revolting a plan ought not to be permitted by any self-respecting tribunal.
Id. at 454-55.
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1. The Subjective (Majority) Approach
The crux of the majority opinion in Sorrells was that, al-
though federal law prohibited Sorrells' procurement of liquor,
Sorrells was not guilty since the law did not apply to him.6 The
doctrinal basis for this conclusion was legislative intent."7 Reading
between the lines of the statute, the Court commented that it could
not have been the "intention of the Congress," in enacting a statute
prohibiting the sale of liquor, that "persons otherwise innocent"
would be targeted for "instigation by government officials."78
The majority's use of a subjective approach had an important
procedural implication. Because the Court interpreted the under-
lying statute as excepting defendants "otherwise innocent,"7' the
Court was obligated to determine whether the defendant was, in
fact, otherwise innocent. The Court made this determination by
looking at the defendant's "predisposition," i.e., whether the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime absent the govern-
ment's inducement. 8° While the Court's reliance on predisposition
in Sorrells was somewhat obscure, later cases more clearly demon-
strated the predisposition concept.
For instance, in Sherman v. United States, decided twenty-
six years after Sorrells, the Court, in affirming its choice of the
subjective approach, overtly signaled the importance of the predis-
position inquiry.81 In Sherman, a government informant and the
defendant separately sought treatment for narcotics addictions. 
"
After a period of time over which the two became acquainted, the
informant told the defendant that he (the informant) was not
responding to treatment and needed some narcotics.8 At first, the
defendant tried to avoid the issue, but after repeated requests
"predicated on [the informant's] presumed suffering," the defendant
obtained a quantity of narcotics that they both used.8
76. See id. at 452 ('The federal courts in sustaining the defense in such circumstances
have proceeded in the view that the defendant is not guilty.") (emphasis added).
77. See generally MARCUS, supra note 21, § 1.06, at 16-19; see also Sorrells, 287 U.S. at
450 ('To construe statutes so as to avoid absurd or glaringly unjust results, foreign to the
legislative purpose, is, as we have seen, a traditional and appropriate function of the courts.").
78. Id. at 448.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 451.
81. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).





The Court reversed Sherman's conviction because it ex-
pressly found him not predisposed to commit the crime at the time
that the informant contacted him.8 Although the defendant had a
nine-year-old drug sales conviction and a five-year-old drug
possession conviction, the Court found these insufficient to "prove
[the defendant] had a readiness to sell narcotics at the time [the
informant] approached him ... ."N Although many may disagree
factually as to whether such prior convictions prove a predisposi-
tion, there is no room for debate regarding the Court's application
of the test. The Court, professing its goal to separate the "unwary
innocent" from the "unwary criminal ''87 expressly reviewed the
defendant's predisposition.8 Thus, after Sorrells and Sherman, the
heart of the subjective test became the predisposition inquirys 9
2. The Objective (Minority) Approach
Despite the Sorrells Court's almost unanimous support for
the formation of the entrapment defense, bitter disagreement
existed over its proper application. Contrary to the majority
analysis, a minority of justices in Sorrells determined that, al-
though Sorrells had clearly violated federal law,9 his conviction
should be reversed based on a "fundamental rule of public policy"
that cautions against overzealous law enforcement.91 The minority
criticized the majority's legislative intent argument as a "strained
and unwarranted construction of the statute .. . ."92 Justice
Robert's concurrence, despite its vigorous admonition for a focus on
government conduct, failed to offer any test for such an inquiry.
Accordingly, in the next Supreme Court entrapment case, Sherman
v. United States, Justice Frankfurter articulated a test to put the
objective theory into practice. 93
85. See id. at 375-76.
86. Id. at 375.
87. Id. at 372.
88. See id. at 375-76.
89. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this fact in United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 433 (1973) ("[Ihe principle element in the defense of entrapment was the defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime.'); see also United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1433 (10th
Cir. 1988) (stating that predisposition is the "crucial factor").
90. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 456 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring)
("[H]is act, coupled with his intent to do the act, brings him within the definition of the law...").
91. Id. at 457.
92. Id. at 456.
93. 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Although still only supported by a minority, Sherman repre-
sented an era in the Court when the objective approach received its
highest level of support' 4  In a forcefully argued concurrence,
Justice Frankfurter argued that, "[n]o matter what the defendant's
past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to
which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police
conduct... is not to be tolerated by an advanced society."g5 Thus,
Justice Frankfurter offered the following standard for determining
entrapment: defendants shall be found entrapped when "police
conduct revealed in the particular case [falls below] standards, to
which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power."96
Just as the subjective test had the procedural implication of
requiring an inquiry into the defendant's personal disposition, the
objective test had the implication of requiring scrutiny of police
conduct. This focus seemed rational considering the common view
that the entrapment defense represented a response to new police
enforcement tactics.97 Nonetheless, subsequent to Sherman,
Supreme Court support for the objective approach dwindled to the
point where, in the most recent entrapment case, the Court's
opinion did not even mention the objective approach. 98 The objec-
tive approach, however, is alive and well outside the Supreme
Court. Besides the numerous commentators who support the
objective approach,99 it has also been adopted by many state courts00
94. See W.H. Johnson, III, Note, Proving a Criminal Predisposition: Separating the
Unwary Innocent from the Unwary Criminal, 43 DUKE L.J. 384, 392 (1993).
95. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 382.
97. See supra note 16.
98. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); see also Fred Warren Bennett,
From Sorrels to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses,
in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 867 (1992) ("[N]o current Justice on the Supreme
Court seems remotely interested in adopting the objective approach to entrapment....').
99. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 48, at 372 ("It is something of a strain to read
an implied exception into the statute (excepting persons induced by law enforcement officials and
their agents, but not those induced by other persons). It seems that public policy is the proper
explanation of the entrapment defense.'); LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME;
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 265-72
(1967); 1 NATIONAL COMM'N. ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 320
(1970) (also known as the "Brown Commission"). See generally Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951);
Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment,
Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 687-90 (1975); J.D. McClean,
Informers and Agents Provocateurs, 1969 CRIM. L. REV. 527, 529-31; Edward Sagarin & Donald
E.J. MacNamara, The Problem of Entrapment, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 363 (1970); Ronald G.
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and legislatures.10, Most notably, the American Law Institute
adopted the objective approach in its Model Penal Code,102 opining
that "the justification for the defense of entrapment" is "to deter
wrongful conduct on the part of the government."103
None of this support for the objective approach, however, has
persuaded the Supreme Court. In the four entrapment cases
decided since Sorrells and Sherman, the Court explicitly reaffirmed
the subjective approach.- Thus, in all federal courts and most
Schecter, Police Procedure and the Accusatorial Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 521 (1967); Paul W.
Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28
FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1959).
100. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tracey, 624 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Mass. 1993) ("[T]he main
purpose of allowing this defense is deterrence of the undesirable manufacturing of crime by law
enforcement officials."); People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 954 (Cal. 1979) (in bank) ("[We are not
concerned with] who first conceived or who willingly, or reluctantly, acquiesced in a criminal
project. What we do care about is how much and what manner of persuasion, pressure, and
cajoling are brought to bear by law enforcement officials to induce persons to commit crimes.');
State v. Leonard, 243 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Iowa 1976) ("Under [the objective test that this court
adopts,] the propensities and predisposition of the particular defendant are irrelevant .... IT]he
police conduct must be sufficiently provocative to induce the normally law-abiding person to
commit a crime.").
101. "The states that currently [have a codified entrapment defense] are Alaska, Arkan-
sas, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Utah and Vermont. It should be noted that North Dakota used an exclusively objective
approach, but has now adopted a hybrid approach." Scott C. Paton, Note, '"Me Government
Made Me Do It'" A Proposed Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 995, 1002 n.45 (1994). For a description of the hybrid approach, see MARCUS,
supra note 21, § 1.15 and Lord, supra note 10, at 498-503.
102. Section 2.13 of the Model Penal Code provides:
A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official
perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of
an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting
such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such
conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement that create a substantial risk that
such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to com-
mit it.
Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person prosecuted for an offense
shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred
in response to an entrapment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in the
absence of the jury. The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is
based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person
perpetrating the entrapment.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962).
103. See id § 2.13 cmt. 1.
104. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992). The Court stated:
Where the Government has induced an individual to break the law and the defense of
entrapment is at issue, as it was in this case, the prosecution must prove beyond reason-
able doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being
approached by Government agents.
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state jurisdictions, it is beyond question that the proper approach is
the subjective one-one that sorts the culpable defendant from the
nonculpable. The tool for accomplishing this separation is the
predisposition inquiry: the predisposed are judged culpable and the
non-predisposed are judged innocent.105 It is unclear, however, what
criteria should be used to determine predisposition.0 This Note
now turns to an analysis of the criteria courts have used to deter-
mine predisposition.
B. The Real Nature of Predisposition
While the Supreme Court has stated that "the principle ele-
ment" of an entrapment case is the "defendant's predisposition," it
has been less forthcoming in explaining what "predisposition"
means. 17 This lack of guiidance has left lower courts on their own to
answer the difficult definitional question: what is predisposition?
The conventional, but unanalyzed, answer to this question is that
predisposition refers to a defendant's mental state.'°8 This common
conception of predisposition, however, is inconsistent with the
Id.; see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) ("[A] valid entrapment defense has
two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the
part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct.'); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 488-89 (1976) ("I]he entrapment defense 'focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime' rather than upon the conduct of the Government agents.")
(citation omitted); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973):
[The entrapment defense] is rooted, not in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dis-
miss prosecutions for what it feels to have been 'overzealous law enforcement', but in-
stead in the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a
defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense but was induced
to commit them by the Government.
105. See Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63 ('Tredisposition, 'the principal element in the defense of
entrapment,' focuses upon whether the defendant was an 'unwary innocent' or, instead, an
'unwary criminal' who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime.')
(citation omitted) (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 433; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
106. See generally MARCUS, supra note 21, § 4.12.
107. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995) ("Predisposition is
necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry because it is a subjective inquiry into a defendant's state of
mind."); United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) ('The focus of the entrapment
inquiry.. is on the defendant's state of mind."); United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 635
(7th Cir. 1984) ("[P]redisposition is, by definition, the defendant's state of mind and inclinations
before his initial exposure to government agents."); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618
(2d Cir. 1983) ("[P]redisposition refers to the state of mind of a defendant before government
agents make any suggestion that he should commit a crime.'); United States v. Garcia, 562 F.2d
411, 418 (7th Cir. 1977) ("Mhe heart of the entrapment issue is predisposition, which is, itself, a
'subjective mental state") (quoting United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152, 155 n.3 (7th Cir.
1977)); United States v. Mulherin, 529 F. Supp. 916, 939 (S.D. Ga. 1981) ("[E]ntrapment...
centers on the mental predisposition of the defendant....).
1884
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methods used by courts to determine predisposition. This section
seeks to resolve this inconsistency by analyzing many circuit court
opinions as well as several Supreme Court opinions. These opin-
ions demonstrate that the "mental state" conception of predisposi-
tion is incorrect. Rather, these opinions suggest that any charac-
teristic of the defendant that sheds light on her culpability should
be considered as a factor in determining predisposition.
While many courts pay lip service to the notion that the pre-
disposition inquiry focuses on the "state of mind of the defendant,"
their true understanding of the inquiry is revealed by the factors
they use to determine predisposition.10 Some courts merely ask if
the defendant was "ready and willing" to commit the crime,1le while
others look at a defendant's reputation for illegal conduct,"' desire
for profit,lu or ability to commit the criminal activity in question13
Some courts utilize an organized list of factors to determine
predisposition, 14 while others shun such a formalized approach.115
109. Townsend, 555 F.2d at 161.
110. See Ulloa, 882 F.2d at 44 ("[W]e have consistently approved the phrase 'ready and
willing' as an appropriate definition of ... predisposition."); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d
823, 849 (2d Cir. 1982) (collecting cases). Black's Law Dictionary defines "predisposition" as a
"defendant's inclination to engage in illegal activity for which he has been charged, i.e., that he is
ready and willing to commit the crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis
added). Often, the "ready and willing" characteristic is evaluated by analyzing the defendant's
response to the government's offer. See, e.g., United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 908
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 218 (lst Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1004 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491,
1499 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir 1985); United
States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1086 (4th Cir. 1984); see also MARCUS, supra note 21, § 4.15, at
141 ("[Ihe most telling evidence of a defendant's state of mind in the entrapment area is the
manner in which she responds to the government inducement.').
111. See, e.g., United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1984) (seeking to
determine "where [the defendant] sits on the continuum between naive first offender and the
street-wise habitue.'); Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1085.
112. See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Groessell, 440 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1971).
113. See United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Defendants were
able to acquire large quantities of cocaine on short notice.... Defendants' ability to obtain the
drug provided sufficient basis for the jury to infer that defendants were well versed in the drug
trade [and thus predisposed.]"); see also United States v. Hernandez, 31 F.3d 354, 360 (6th Cir.
1994); Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 872 n.5. The use of ability to determine predisposition in this
regard is distinct from that in Hollingsworth. While Hollingsworth held that a lack of ability
demonstrated a lack of predisposition, cases such as Gunter and Perez-Leon held that a
demonstration of ability suggested a predisposition. Thus, the pre-Hollingsworth rule regarding
ability in federal courts was that an affirmative ability to commit the crime suggested a
predisposition to commit the crime, but a lack of ability did not indicate a lack of predisposition.
114. For instance, the Eighth Circuit utilizes the following factors to determine predispo-
sition:
(1) whether the defendant readily responded to the inducement offered; (2) the circum-
stances surrounding the illegal conduct; (3) the state of mind of a defendant before gov-
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These variable approaches reveal two truths regarding the
predisposition inquiry. First, there is no settled approach for
determining a defendant's predisposition. Second, viewing in detail
each of the factors considered by lower federal courts, it is doubtful
that the purpose of the predisposition inquiry is solely to determine
a defendant's state of mind.16 Certainly, some factors, such as the
defendant's response to the government's offer, are probative of the
defendant's state of mind.117 But other factors considered by courts
lack any insight into the defendant's state of mind. For example,
consider a defendant's past acts, criminal or otherwise1B It is
unclear how these reflect the defendant's state of mind at the time
of the present crime because the defendant's criminal history does
not necessarily indicate a predisposition to commit the present
crime.119 Courts have also considered the defendant's reputation,-
but -this characteristic also fails to indicate a defendant's state of
mind at the time of the crime.
eminent agents make any suggestion that he shall commit a crime;(4) whether the de-
fendant was engaged in an existing course of conduct similar to the crime for which he is
charged; (5) whether the defendant had already formed the "design" to commit the crime
for which he is charged; (6) the defendant's reputation; (7) the conduct of the defendant
during the negotiations with the undercover agent; (8) whether the defendant has re-
fused to commit similar acts on other occasions; (9) the nature of the crime charged; (10)
the degree of coercion present in the instigation law officers have contributed to the
transaction relative to the defendant's criminal background.
Dion, 762 F.2d at 687-88 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 807
(9th Cir. 1986); Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 871; United States v. Knight, 604 F. Supp. 984, 987 (S.D.
Ohio 1985).
115. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit opined in United States v. Brown:
Predisposition is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry because it is a subjective inquiry
into a defendant's state of mind. Therefore, entrapment as a matter of law cannot be re-
duced to any enumerated list of factors for a reviewing court to examine. Any list would
necessarily be over and under inclusive by omitting factors which might prove crucial to
a predisposition inquiry in one prosecution but are totally irrelevant in another.
United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1085 & n.9
("Predisposition is necessarily a nebulous concept . . . . It is simply naive to suppose that
[defendants] can be neatly divided between the pure of heart and those with a 'criminal'
outlook.").
116. This is forcefully supported by the list of factors used in Dion. See supra note 114.
The Dion list includes the defendant's state of mind among several other factors. However,
many other courts still refer to predisposition solely as a defendant's state of mind. See supra
note 108.
117. See MARCUS, supra note 21, § 4.15, at 141 ("Mhe most telling evidence of the defen-
dant's state of mind.. .is the manner in which she responds to the government inducement.").
118. See generally id. § 4.17.
119. See Maura F.J. Whelan, Lead Us Not Into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to
Replace the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1193, 1205-06 (1985).
120. See generally MARCUS, supra note 21, § 4.18.
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Perhaps the most interesting instance of a court's departure
from a strict "state of mind" inquiry occurred in United States v.
Dion.1 Dion involved an adolescent Native American boy who was
induced by the government to illegally procure American eagles.-
Knowing that the boy was extremely poor, the government offered
him large sums of money for the performance of the crime.- In
finding the boy entrapped, the court opined that "the unusual
poverty of the defendant.., must be considered in determining
predisposition."124 This reasoning is particularly interesting because
one would suppose that an extremely poor person is, if predisposed
at all, predisposed to commit a crime for money. Nonetheless, the
court, explicitly taking account of the boy's wont of money, found
him not predisposed.- The court's reasoning seemed to be based on
the rational observation that the government ought not be allowed
to create crime on the backs of the desperately poor.- This case
forcefully suggests that the predisposition inquiry is not merely an
inquiry into the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime,
but rather a method for determining whether the defendant,
considering the totality of the circumstances, is blameworthy. It is
illogical to think that past acts, reputation, or financial status
indicate a defendant's state of mind at the time of the alleged
crime. It is much more logical, however, to think that such charac-
teristics may affect a general estimation of the defendant's blame-
worthiness.
Supreme Court precedent echoes what Dion demonstrates:
"predisposition" refers to more than the defendant's state of mind.
While the Court used the word "predisposition" generously
throughout its entrapment opinions, it also summarized the
entrapment concept many times without using the word "predispo-
sition." These summarizations give insight into the Court's
121. United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985).
122. See id. at 678-79.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 689.
125. See id. at 689-90.
126. The Eighth Circuit commented:
In this case, the government agents came upon an extremely impoverished Indian Reser-
vation in a desolate area of South Dakota where, according to some of the witnesses at
the trial below, life is for many Indians, a mere question of simple survival. The risk for
the government in offering so much money to these individuals over a nearly two-and-
one-half year period was that many who would never have shot a protected bird would be
enticed into doing so.
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understanding of the real nature of the predisposition inquiry. For
example, in Jacobson, the Court concluded its opinion by stating:
"When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the appre-
hension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own
devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the courts
should intervene."=7 To best understand the meaning of this quote,
note that elsewhere in Jacobson and throughout Supreme Court
entrapment doctrine, the Court explicitly recognizes that entrap-
ment cases hinge on the predisposition of the defendant.- Reading
the Jacobson quote in this context, it is clear that a defendant is not
predisposed "if left to his own devices, [he] likely would have never
run afoul of the law.. . ." This understanding is considerably
broader than whether the defendant was of a state of mind to
commit the crime.
Other cases reinforce this assertion. For instance, in Sor-
rells, the Court declared that
'it is [improper] to punish a man for the commission of an offense of the
like of which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and
evidently never would have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not
inspired, incited, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to, commit it.'
129
As well, in Sherman, the Court stated "Thus the Government [in
inducing the crime] plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party
and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would
not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require methods
such as this."13°
Although these quotes omit the word "predisposition," they
are nonetheless instructive regarding the fundamental legal
meaning of "predisposition." "Predisposition" in these cases is
obviously understood to mean more than "tending" or "inclined," as
it is defined in the dictionary,-' or "state of mind," as it is defined
127. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
128. "Where the Government has induced an individual to break the law.., the prosecu-
tion must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the
criminal act ...." Id. at 548-49; see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988);
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433
(1973) ("[The principal element in the defense of entrapment was the defendant's predisposition
to commit the crime.").
129. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1932) (quoting Butts v. United
States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921)).
130. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958).
131. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1786 (1993).
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by the circuit courts.13 2 This observation makes sense when the
purpose of the entrapment defense is taken into account. With a
purpose of sorting the "unwary innocent" from the "unwary crimi-
nal," 3 it only makes sense that predisposition, the "principal
element in the defense," should serve as some measure of blame-
worthiness.13 Thus, while courts define "predisposition" in various
ways, the meaning of "predisposition" should be construed in such a
way that it furthers the goals of the entrapment defense. Accord-
ingly, a list of factors indicating predisposition should not be
confined solely to criminal tendencies, but rather should encompass
all factors that separate the innocent from the culpable.
C. The Act Requirement in Criminal Law
Our criminal law system is a rule-based system.135 Such a
system not only informs individuals of the specific behavior that
will result in punishment,im but also ensures that criminal liability
will be confined to those who truly deserve punishment."1' For the
most part, each rule in our system contains two elements: a mens
rea and an actus reus."8 The mens rea requirement generally is
defended on retributive grounds, with the theory being that it is
morally unjust to punish those who did not consciously choose to
cause harm.19 The actus reus requirement, which is the subject of
this section, is understood to have many purposes.
First, and most basically, the act requirement in a rule-
based system ensures that a defendant actually has done "some-
thing that deserves punishment."'' Punishment based on retribu-
tive and preventive grounds is thus efficiently and fairly adminis-
tered because it is meted out only to those who have demonstrated
an ability to commit the proscribed wrong.'4, The act requirement
132. See supra note 108.
133. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
134. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
135. See Jonathon C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrap-
ment Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1053-54 (1987).
136. See id. at 1053-56.
137. See id.
138. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 27, at 191-92.
139. See HOLMES, supra note 61, at 3 ("[E]ven a dog distinguishes between being stumbled
over and being kicked.").
140. See Carlson, supra note 135, at 1054; see also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 312, at 353 (1958) ("[Ihe State..,. suffers not from the
imaginations of men .... ').
141. See Carlson, supra note 135, at 1054-55.
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also has pragmatic value in that it assists in the determination of a
defendant's mens rea.'4 2  Without an act as evidence, it is more
difficult to know what a person was thinking when that individual
committed the crime.143
But probably most central to the act requirement's justifica-
tion is the notion that the criminal law should not be so broadly
defined as to encompass those who prevent their ideas from
becoming actions.-M In this sense, the requirement preserves an
individual's freedom of thought by ensuring that "no crime can be
committed by bad thoughts alone."145 As one commentator put it: "If
[the law] were not so restricted [as to require only a mens rea] it
would be utterly intolerable; all mankind would be criminals, and
most of their lives would be passed in trying and punishing each
other . "... 146
The act requirement also protects individuals from the state
in other ways. First, the requirement ensures that an individual
will not be subjected to the processes of the state unless that person
chooses to by acting.147 Second, the act requirement restrains a
142. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 25, at 179; JEROME HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 171-80 (2d ed. 1960).
143. William Blackstone recognized this aspect of the actus reus:
Indeed, to make a complete crime, cognizable by human laws, there must be both a will
and an act. For, though, in foro conscientiae (at the tribunal of conscience), a fixed design
or will to do an unlawful act is almost as heinous as the commission of it, yet, as no tem-
poral tribunal can search the heart or fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than
as they are demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it can-
not know. For which reason, in all temporal jurisdictions an overt act, or some open evi-
dence of an intended crime, is necessary, in order to demonstrate the depravity of the
will, before the man is liable to punishment.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *20-21; see also Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to
Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 405 (1959) (stating that the requirement of an act is
"[r]ooted in skepticism about the ability... to know what passes through the minds of men").
144. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 25, at 179; see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 543-44 (1968) ("Perhaps more fundamental is the difficulty of distinguishing, in the absence
of any conduct, between desires of the day-dream variety and fixed intentions that may pose a
real threat to society... !).
145. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 25, at 178; see also United States v. Muzii, 676
F.2d 919, 920 (2d Cir. 1982) (" The reach of criminal law has long been limited by the principle
that no one is punishable for his thoughts."); Powell, 392 U.S. at 543-44 ("When a desire is
inhibited it may find expression in fantasy; but it would be absurd to condemn this natural
psychological mechanism as illegal.'") (quoting GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW-THE
GENERAL PART 2 (2d ed. 1961))
146. 2 JAMES FITWJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 78
(London, Macfillan 1883).
147. As one commentator put it:
[The act requirement protects the] capacity of the individual. . . to live his life in reason-
able freedom from socially imposed external constraints [by providing a] locus poeniten-
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government from malicious or discriminatory punishment. To this
end, the act requirement provides "some devices to insure that the
initiating decisions are, to the greatest extent possible, fair,
evenhanded, and rational... [in that] the police and prosecutors
confine their attention to the catalogue of what has already been
defined as criminal."148
Predictably, there is wide support for the act requirement in
the common law. The Supreme Court has declared definitively that
punishment for thoughts alone is a "situation universally sought to
be avoided in our criminal law. . .. "149 Courts at other levels have
also concurred with the Supreme Court,1w at times striking down
laws that punish intent only.151 Not surprisingly, the American Law
Institute has followed suit in its Model Penal Code by precluding
conviction in cases that do not "include[ ] a voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act of which [the defendant] was physically
capable."252
Given the well-settled criminal law requirement of an act, as
well as the long-established purpose of the entrapment defense, and
the real nature of the predisposition inquiry, an argument in favor
of the positional predisposition inquiry will now be made.
D. Allowing Ability to be Determinative of Predisposition
To review the logic of this Note thus far, Part III.A estab-
lished that the purpose of the entrapment defense is to sort the
culpable from the nonculpable. Then Part III.B established that
the predisposition inquiry is merely a generalized estimation of a
tiae, a point of no return beyond which external constraints may be imposed but before
which the individual is free.., of the very specific social compulsions of the law.
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 75 (1968).
148. Id. at 89-90; see also Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality
and the Legal Process, 53 MINN. L REV. 665, 688 (1969) ('The requirement that the defendant's
acts be themselves unlawful, rather than commonplace and permitted, establishes a formidable
barrier between the organs of state and private citizens.").
149. Powell, 392 U.S. at 543.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[B]ecause
of... the danger of convicting for mere 'thoughts'[,]... we require that the 'substantial step'
consist of 'objective acts . ' ") (quoting United States v. Pennyman, 889 F.2d 104, 106 (6th Cir.
1989)); Muzii, 676 F.2d at 920 ("The reach of the criminal law has long been limited by the
principle that no one is punishable for his thoughts.").
151. See Ex parte Smith, 36 S.W. 628, 629 (Mo. 1896), State v. Labato, 80 A.2d 617, 622
(N.J. 1951), Lambert v. State, 374 P.2d 783, 785 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962), and Proctor v. State,
176 P. 771, 772-73 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918), all holding that a law that results in punishment for
thought alone is improper.
152. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 102, § 2.01(1).
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defendant's culpability, not a structured analysis of the defendant's
state of mind. Finally, Part III.C explained the act requirement
and its essential role in the determination of culpability. These
assertions lead to the conclusion set out below.
In entrapment cases, courts should allow ability to be deter-
minativeu of predisposition because criminal ability is highly
probative of whether a defendant is culpable. A person who has no
ability to commit a crime can do no more than think about the
crime.54 An unable, though willing, defendant is not culpable
because culpability requires a mens rea and an actus reus, and such
a defendant cannot independently satisfy the actus reus require-
ment. Thus, a defendant who, absent the government's assistance,
could have done no more than think about the crime should not be
punished. To do otherwise would result in the punishment of a
defendant who is not culpable.-
Invoking the actus reus principle in defense of the positional
predisposition requirement should not be done mechanically. In
this case, however, such analogous reasoning is appropriate
because both doctrines serve similar ends. For example, in the
same way that the act requirement ensures penal efficiency by
administering punishment only to those who have done "something
153. Ability should be independently determinative of predisposition, regardless of other
factors indicating predisposition, because an individual who cannot satisfy the act requirement is
not culpable. Thus, no matter how criminally eager an individual may seem in certain respects,
an inability nullifies any culpability that the individual may have. Some courts and commenta-
tors disagree, suggesting that inability, if it is to be considered at all, should be only one of
several factors to be considered in determining predisposition. See United States v. Thickstun,
110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A person's ability to commit a crime may illustrate her
predisposition to do so, but should not become a separate element to be proven."); see also
Rankin, supra note 10, at 1513; Rothstein, supra note 10, at 326-27 ("If the Hollingsworth court
had utilized 'readiness' as one of several factors pertinent to the determination of predisposition,
but not as separate as a separate and independent prong of the entrapment analysis, then these
other factors would have clearly demonstrated the existence of predisposition.") (footnotes
omitted). These comments fail to justify a finding of culpability for defendants who are not
independently capable of satisfying the actus reus requirement.
154. As stated in note 61, supra, the ability to act ip used in its strictest sense at this point
in the Note. It is understood, of course, that a defendant may have enough ability to attempt the
crime, but not enough ability to complete the crime. Thus, on one level, it is improper to speak of
ability and inability as black and white, since there are many varying shades of gray. Indeed, in
Part IV, this Note argues that punishment is warranted for the many occasions where a
defendant is unable to complete the crime, but still able to attempt the crime. This Part only
argues that ability is probative of culpability, not that inability should be exculpatory in all
cases.
155. See generally Carlson, supra note 135 (arguing that criminal encouragement by
police officers diminishes the threshold of the actus reus fif entrapment cases).
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that deserves punishment,' m the criminal ability requirement in
predisposition analysis ensures efficiency by punishing only those
who could do "something that deserves punishment." Without such
a rule, judicial and law enforcement resources are wasted. 57
In the same way that the actus reus requirement prevents
the state from arbitrarily or maliciously choosing who to prosecute,
requiring independent criminal ability for an entrapment defendant
ensures that the state cannot create crime.58 Without the require-
ment of criminal ability in entrapment cases, government agents of
sophisticated training could have the freedom to coax, and even
coerce, citizens into crimes.
Thus, the positional predisposition inquiry is appropriate in
entrapment cases. The inquiry is consistent with the purpose of the
entrapment defense, consistent with established methods of
predisposition evaluation, and consistent with the act requirement
in criminal law. This Note now turns to a question that the above
argument begs: how unable must a defendant be to warrant
exculpation?
156. Id. at 1054.
157. In United States v. Kaminski, Judge Posner, commented on the penal efficiency
aspect of the subjective approach to the entrapment defense:
If the police entice someone to commit a crime who would not have done so without their
blandishments, and then arrest him and he is prosecuted, convicted, and punished, law
enforcement resources are squandered in the following sense: resources that could and
should have been used in an effort to reduce the nation's unacceptably high crime rate
are used instead in the entirely sterile activity of first inciting and then punishing a
crime.
United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983).
158. In the Seventh Circuit's first opinion on United States v. Hollingsworth, Judge
Posner reviewed a portion of the rationale for the entrapment defense that highlights this
concern:
We have said that the doctrine's purpose 'is to prevent the police from turning a law-
abiding person into a criminal,' from corrupting him, in other words. "Te function of law
enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly,
that function does not include the manufacturing of crime.' 'The power of government is
abused and directed to an end for which it was not constituted when employed to pro-
mote rather than detect crime and to bring about the downfall of those who, left to them-
selves, might well have obeyed the law.'
A person who would not commit a crime unless induced to do so by the government is
not a threat to society and the criminal law has no proper concern with him, however evil
his thoughts or deficient his character.
United States v. Hollingsworth, 9 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1993), aff'd en banc, 27 F.3d 1196
(7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (internal citations omitted).
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IV. THE SCOPE OF EXCULPATION FOR INABILITY
Although ability is probative of culpability in entrapment
cases, it is improper to assert that all unable defendants are not
culpable. Indeed, the law has long recognized, through attempt
law, that defendants who are unable to complete their crimes are
still somewhat culpable. 159 Thus, mere inability to complete a crime
should not automatically be exculpatory in entrapment cases.
Rather, unable criminals who are nonetheless culpable should still
be punished. In attempt law, criminals unable to complete their
crimes are evaluated for culpability through the use of the impossi-
bility doctrine. Thus, the impossibility doctrine is a useful template
for determining the scope of exculpation for inability in entrapment
cases.
This Part of the Note argues that an independently unable
defendant in an entrapment case should be exonerated only when
such inability would be grounds for invoking an impossibility
defense if prosecuted for an attempt of the same crime. To defend
this assertion, this section begins by discussing the impossibility
doctrine, its various categories, and the factual parameters of each.
With the impossibility doctrine fully presented, a comparison will
then be made between the predisposition inquiry and the impossi-
bility defense. This comparison will lead to the conclusion that,
because both doctrines are dedicated to the same purposes, impos-
sibility can fairly serve as a template for evaluating the scope of
exculpation in questions of positional predisposition. Then, using
the current law under impossibility, the proper scope of exculpation
for unable defendants in entrapment cases will be fashioned.
Finally, using this newly-fashioned rule, the Hollingsworth decision
will be reevaluated.
A. The Purpose of the Impossibility Defense
Like the entrapment defense, the purpose of the impossibil-
ity defense is one of sorting-it sorts the culpable defendant from
the nonculpable. Two exemplary cases, which are described more
fully in subsequent sections, demonstrate this purpose.
159. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 472-83 (1978);
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125-35
(1968); Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the Code,
and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 734 (1988).
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Suppose that an individual has decided to take the life of an-
other. To effect this desire, the assailant procures a gun, tracks
down the victim, and presses the gun's barrel to the victim's head.
With full intent for death to occur, the assailant pulls the trigger,
and is surprised by an anti-climatic "click"; the gun was not loaded.
Although murder with an unloaded gun is "impossible," the law is
clear that an impossibility defense is unavailable in such circum-
stances.1w
Compare this case to that of another assailant: a witch doc-
tor. In this case, the witch doctor, desiring the death of another,
employs a voodoo doll and several needles to accomplish his goal.
Of course, no death occurs. Although this murder was just as
impossible as the one in the above example, many courts would
grant an impossibility defense to this assailant.161
Why grant an impossibility defense in one impossible at-
tempt but not another? The answer lies in the perceived culpability
of the defendant. In the first case, the defendant clearly manifested
her culpability by wanting the victim to die (evidencing a mens rea)
and pulling the trigger (evidencing an actus reus). In the second
case, the culpability of the defendant is doubtful. Although the
assailant acted by pushing needles into the doll, the presence of a
meaningful mens rea is doubtful because anyone who truly in-
tended death would use something more efficacious than a doll and
needles.162
Thus, viewing the above examples together, the impossibility
defense appears to be available to defendants with doubtful
culpability and is not available to defendants who are clearly
culpable.16 Seen in this way, the purpose of the impossibility
defense, like the entrapment defense, is one of sorting: it sorts the
160. See, e.g., State v. Datums, 100 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 1960). See Part IV.B for further
impossible attempts where an impossibility defense is not available.
161. This hypothetical is often cited as the paradigmatic example of an inherently impos-
sible attempt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344, 348 (Pa. 1933).
162. Of course, the logical retort to this assertion is that anyone who "truly intended
death" would check to make sure her gun was loaded-suggesting that the defendant in the first
example was not truly culpable. As is described in Part IV.C.1-2, infra, courts, in applying the
impossibility defense, differentiate between mere lackadaisical execution of a crime and a
ludicrous misapprehension of means needed to commit a crime. A ludicrous misapprehension of
means raises serious doubts about the defendant's intent that mere lackadaisicalness does not.
163. See HALL, supra note 142, at 591-94; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 60, at 441; 1
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 85(a), at 423 (1984) ("[T]he actor's personal
culpability, the harmfulness of his conduct, and his dangerousness . . . determines the
availability of the impossibility defense.'); 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §
699, at 633-37 (15th ed. 1996).
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culpable from the nonculpable. To deal with the many permuta-
tions of impossible attempts, courts have established three catego-
ries of impossibility: factual impossibility, hybrid legal impossibil-
ity, and inherent impossibility.16 These categories will now be
discussed.
B. When Impossibility is Not a Defense: Factual and
Hybrid Legal Impossibility
1. Factual Impossibility
Factual impossibility exists when a person's intended end is
the commission of a crime, but attendant circumstances beyond
that person's control or unknown to the person prevent the crime's
consummation.- The most common examples include: a pickpocket
who attempts to steal from an empty pocket;'1 a defendant who
attempts to shoot another person with an unloaded gun;6 7 and a
doctor who attempts an abortion on a woman who is not pregnant.16
In each of these cases, had the circumstances been as the perpetra-
tor believed they would be, the crime would have been consum-
mated.
With the exception of a short period in the mid-nineteenth
century, 16 common law courts have refused to allow factual impos-
164. A fourth type of impossibility, pure legal impossibility, has been recognized as a valid
defense by many courts. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 38 So. 46 (Miss. '1905). Such a defense is
available "when the law does not proscribe what the defendant sought to achieve." Ira P.
Robbins, Attempting the Impossible. The Emerging Consensus, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 389
(1986). See also HALL, supra note 142, at 595. The legal impossibility defense has been omitted
from this Note because, as many have recognized, it is not really an impossibility defense.
Rather, "[t]he reason for not convicting [the defendant] has nothing to do with the failure of the
enterprise, but rather with the absence of any prohibition of the conduct whether completed or
not." Graham Hughes, One Further Footnote on Attempting the Impossible, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1005, 1006 (1967).
165. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 60, at 440-42; see also United States v.
Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188 (3d Cir. 1973); see generally Robbins, supra note 164.
166. See People v. Fiegelman, 91 P.2d 156, 157 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939); People v. Moran,
25 N.E. 412, 413 (N.Y. 1890); People v. Jones, 9 N.W. 486, 486-87 (Mich. 1881); Commonwealth
v. McDonald, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 365, 366 (1850).
167. See State v. Damms, 100 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Wis. 1960).
168. See People v. Cummings, 296 P.2d 610, 612 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956), and People v.
Huff, 171 N.E. 261, 262 (Ill. 1930), both decided when abortion was illegal.




sibility as a defense. 17° In the Model Penal Code as well, factual
impossibility has been abolished as a defense. 17 The presumption
behind such decisions is that the defendant has "plainly mani-
fested172 his or her culpability and is thus "just as much in need of
restraint and corrective treatment as the defendant who did not
meet with the unanticipated events which barred successful
completion of the crime."' 73
2. Hybrid Legal Impossibility
As the name implies, this type of impossibility involves a
combination of concepts. A claim of hybrid legal impossibility
arises if the defendant makes a factual miscalculation regarding
the legal status of an attendant circumstancey74 For example, if a
person wishing to pick the pocket of another mistakenly picks the
pocket of a stone statue, the perpetrator has made a miscalculation
regarding the legal status of the statue: the perpetrator thought the
statue was a human, but according to the law, such an object has no
human status. 175 Similar examples that have been noted include: a
person who tries to hunt deer out of season by shooting a stuffed
animal;176 a person who shoots a tree stump believing that it is a
human;'17 or a person who shoots a corpse believing that it is alive.78
For the most part,79 the defense of hybrid legal impossibility
has been abolished in the common laws and under the Code.181 This
170. See United States v. Sobrilski, 127 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that factual
impossibility is not a defense to an attempt crime); United States v. Cotts, 14 F.3d 300, 307 (7th
Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1991) (same).
171. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 102, § 5.01 (1) ("A person is guilty of an attempt
[if he] purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant circum-
stances were as he believes them to be .. .
172. Id. § 5.01 cmt. 3(a), at 309.
173. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 60, at 441.
174. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 n.16 (3d Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that
certain types of legal impossibility are often termed "hybrid" legal impossibility).
175. See Trent v. Commonwealth, 156 S.E. 567, 569 (Va. 1931) (dictum).
176. See State v. Guffey, 262 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
177. See id. at 156; Regina v. M'Pherson, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 281, 284 (1857); Rex v. Os-
borne, 84 J.P. 63, 64 (Central Crim. Ct. 1919).
178. See State v. Taylor, 133 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Mo. 1939) (dictum); Guffey, 262 S.W.2d at
156.
179. The defense of hybrid legal impossibility has been retained by the Third Circuit. See
Hsu, 155 F.3d at 199-200; United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 190 (3d Cir. 1973).
180. According to the American Law Institute, very little support for the hybrid legal
impossibility defense can be found anywhere. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 102, § 5.01
cmt. 3(b), at 317.
181. See supra note 171.
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is because of its implicit similarity to factual impossibility.182 The
same presumption made in factual impossibility cases is appropri-
ate here as well: defendants are culpable because, had the circum-
stances been as the defendant hoped they would be, the crime
would have been committed.83 While cases of hybrid legal impossi-
bility involve a miscalculation that is legally based, the miscalcula-
tion is, at heart, still factual. Whether a stump appears to be a
stump or a person is a question of fact, not of law.
C. When Impossibility is a Defense: Inherent Impossibility
Despite courts' refusal to grant an impossibility defense in
most circumstances, certain cases of "inherent impossibility" are
commonly excepted. A claim of inherent impossibility (sometimes
referred to as "inherent factual impossibility"14 or "obvious impossi-
bility"15) arises when a defendant employs a means to commit a
crime which an ordinary person would view as totally inappropriate
for the objective sought.'8 An oft-cited example is that of a witch
doctor who sought to kill his victim by puncturing a voodoo doll
with a needle.187 In this example, the defendant had a clear intent
to complete the crime, committed the act as planned, but, like cases
of factual and hybrid legal impossibility, was mistaken in his
assessment of the necessary means. Thus, inherent impossibility
sometimes garners its "factual" modifier because, at its heart, the
miscalculation is still a factual mistake.18 Inherent impossibility,
however, is maintained as a separate category of impossible
attempts because of the degree of miscalculation committed by the
defendant.
A comparison of two cases illustrates this point. In Kunkle
v. State, a defendant attempted to kill another person, but used a
182. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 199 ("[T]he great majority of jurisdictions have now recognized
that [hybrid] legal and factual impossibility are 'logically indistinguishable"') (quoting United
States v. Darnell, 545 F.2d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1976)); see also United States v. Quijada, 588 F.2d
1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Duran, 884 F. Supp. 577, 580 n.5 (D.D.C. 1995)
(noting that "categorizing a case as involving legal versus factual impossibility is difficult, if not
pointless') affd 96 F.3d 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
183. See supra note 173.
184. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.07[C], at 370 (2d ed.
1995).
185. See TORCIA, supra note 163, § 698.
186. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 59, § 60, at 445.
187. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344, 348 (Pa. 1933) (dicta).
188. See DRESSLER, supra note 184, at § 27.07[C].
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bullet that was not lethal from the distance it was shot.189 The court
denied any defense of factual impossibility and convicted the
defendant of attempted murder.'1 Compare this to a hypothetical
case presented in State v. Logan.1'9 The court suggested that, had
the defendant attempted to "sink a battleship with a popgun," no
conviction would be warranted because such an act is so inherently
unlikely to result in the harm intended.'19 These two cases share
one important characteristic: both perpetrators chose a means that
was insufficient to complete their intended crimes. One defendant,
however, was punished and the other exonerated. The reason for
the difference lies in the degree of miscalculation. While the first
perpetrator merely made a casual misjudgment regarding his
means, the second made an egregious, indeed ludicrous,
misassessment of his means.
At this point, it is essential to clarify the proper meaning of
"inherently impossible." To do that, consider the case State v.
Glover.93 Glover involved a girl who attempted to kill a seventeen-
month-old infant.194 The heard that one drop would be lethal, and
thus administered the drug to the infant.95 Focusing only on her
act, a court might logically conclude that the attempt was "inher-
ently impossible," suggesting that she was not culpable. But
viewing her act in light of the circumstances as she saw them,
namely that she was under the reasonable impression that the
substance would be lethal, her act suggests that she indeed was
culpable. Finding her guilty of attempted murder, the court agreed,
stating:
There being testimony to the effect that the defendant had heard that the
drug was poisonous, and that a very small portion of it-one drop-would
kill, it was wholly immaterial to inquire whether the drug was in fact poi-
sonous.... If the defendant administered the drug with intent to kill, af-
ter having heard that it would have that effect, all the elements of the of-
fense charged were present .... [T]he fact that the act done by her fell far
short of effecting her intent cannot affect the question.
196
189. See Kunkle v. State, 32 Ind. 220, 224-25 (1869).
190. See id. at 227-28.
191. State v. Logan, 656 P.2d 777, 779 (Kan. 1983).
192. See id.
193. State v. Glover, 4 S.E. 564 (S.C. 1888).
194. See id. at 564.
195. See id. at 564-66.
196. Id. at 565-66.
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Thus, the proper conception of inherent impossibility con-
tains a component of reasonableness, or extreme unreasonableness
to be more accurate. 19 7 If the defendant acted with the reasonable
expectation that the act would cause harm, such an act should not
be considered inherently impossible, no matter how unlikely the
desired result.'98 On the other hand, if a defendant acted with an
extremely unreasonable belief in the efficacy of her act, then it
should be considered an inherently impossible attempt.
To further illustrate this point, suppose a perpetrator has
just read in a renowned medical journal that aspirin, when mixed
with coffee, is lethal. Although, in actuality, murder in such a
fashion is "inherently impossible," the perpetrator should not be
exculpated. The perpetrator's belief is reasonable given the prior
perusal of the medical journal.99 On the other hand, a perpetrator
acts extremely unreasonably in attempting to sink a battleship with
a pop gun. The "reasonableness" component is essential because it
permits the court to infer that the aspirin murderer, as compared to
the battleship stalker, has a true intent and is thus a culpable
individual. Had the aspirin murderer picked up a copy of Soldier of
Fortune instead of the New England Journal of Medicine, a death
surely would have occurred. Thus, it is perhaps more accurate to
refer to "inherently impossible" attempts as "inherently unreason-
able and impossible" attempts.
197. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L REV. 821, 850-51 (1928)
("[T]he unsuccessful effort to achieve a criminal consequence should be punished if, and only if, a
reasonable man in the same circumstances as the defendant might expect the defendant's acts to
cause the consummation of the crime."); see also Kyle S. Brodie, 7we Obviously Impossible
Attempt: A Proposed Revision to the Model Penal Code, 15 N. ILL. L. REV. 237, 251-56 (1995)
(arguing the merits of a reasonableness standard in inherent impossibility cases). But see HALL,
supra note 142, at 593 (arguing that sometimes "normal persons take an extremely marginal
chance of successfully committing a harm, e.g., shooting at someone 1000 feet away with a bow
and arrow").
198. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 510-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(rejecting an inherent impossibility defense for a HIV-positive defendant on trial for attempted
murder after biting another under the belief that a bite could transmit the lethal virus).
199. This example is borrowed from Kyle S. Brodie, as published in the Northern Illinois
Law Review. See Brodie, supra note 197, at 249. Despite the importance of the reasonableness
component, some state statutes fail to include it. For instance, Minnesota allows an impossibil-
ity defense if "such impossibility would have been clearly evident to a person of normal
understanding." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.17(2) (West 1987). Written as such, the statute would
not convict the aspirin murderer.
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1. The Presumption Behind the Inherent Impossibility Defense
The inherent impossibility defense presumes that the ludi-
crous nature of the defendant's act indicates that the defendant had
no true intent and is therefore not culpable. Such a conclusion,
however, may not be immediately obvious; after all, the proverbial
witch doctor wanted death to occur and pushed a needle through a
doll to effectuate that desire. Such facts seem to satisfy the mens
rea and actus reus requirements. A closer analysis reveals,
however, that the existence of a mens rea is doubtful at best.-
In criminal law, a defendant's mens rea is often inferred
from the act committed.201 In cases of inherent impossibility, courts
reason that, because the means chosen by the defendant were so
ludicrous for the purpose sought, the defendant presumably had no
mens rea to commit the crime. Put another way, anyone with a real
intent to sink a battleship, for example, would use more than a pop
gun; thus, if a pop gun were used, the defendant could not have had
a real intent to cause the result and therefore cannot be deemed
culpable. As the American Law Institute has stated: "if the means
selected were absurd, there is good ground for doubting that the
actor really planned to commit a crime."-
At this point, a fair criticism of the presumption behind the
inherent impossibility defense must be fielded. Critics point out
that "there is danger to the public in leaving uncorrected a man
who is bent on murder"- presumably because "[t]he voodoo witch-
doctor may use a gun next time."'- The crux of this criticism is that
"extreme mistakes regarding the external world" may indicate a
"severe mental disorder," and thus a possible danger to the public
which warrants incarceration.- This criticism fails because, as
Professor Hall correctly observed, "segregation of dangerous
psychotics is quite different from punishment for a criminal
200. See Sayre, supra note 197, at 850-51
201. See supra notes 142-43.
202. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 102, § 5.01 § 5.01 cmt. 3(b), at 315; see also
Brodie, supra note 197, at 246-47 ("In determining the actor's intent, we start with his actions,
and then swing across a canyon of inference, landing at his probable intent; if the actions are
absurd, then the gap between action and intent becomes too wide to cross.").
203. WILLIAMS, supra note 145, § 207(b), at 645.
204. Jerome B. Elkind, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts: A Theorist's Headache, 54 VA.
L. REV. 20, 33 (1968).
205. HALL, supra note 142, at 592.
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attempt."- Under the long-established tenets of criminal law,
punishment for a crime can only proceed upon a finding of culpa-
bility, not merely a finding of dangerousness.
2. The State of Inherent Impossibility Law
There is a paucity of cases defining the law of inherent im-
possibility because the doctrine deals only with cases of very
extenuated fact patterns. Nevertheless, the cases that do exist on
the subject support the availability of the defense.- Further, by
combining the case law with legislative pronouncements and
scholarly commentary, it becomes clear that inherent impossibility
is an accepted defense in attempt cases.
Early cases, while not mentioning inherent impossibility by
name, implicitly recognized the concept. For example, in Attorney
General v. Sillem, the court commented on whether attempted
murder through witchcraft could be prosecuted: "[A]n attempt [to
kill] by means of witchcraft... would not be an offence within [a
statute prohibiting attempted murder]."- The court reasoned that,
while "[I]t is true the sin... may be as great as an attempt.., by
competent means," laws are not written to "punish sin, but to
prevent crime and mischief. '"20 9 Consider also a case of a murder
attempt foiled by an innocuous poison. Judge Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., then serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, commented that "[u]sually, acts which are expected to
bring about the end without further interference on the part of the
criminal are [grounds for an attempt conviction], unless the expecta-
tion is very absurd."210 Later cases continued to hold that very low
probability attempts would not be punished. For example, in
Dahlberg v. People, the court commented that an "[attempt] is
complete if the means employed appeared ... adequate; but, if the
206. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05, A.L.I. PROC., at 413-14 (1960) ("In order to
meet [the problem of inherently impossible attempts] we extended the normal power of the court
to reduce the grade of to the point of permitting the court-in cases where there really is a
finding of no danger-to dismiss conspiracy to kill by incantation, hex murderers and so on.")
(Professor Weschler commenting).
207. It is arguable that judicial disapproval of the inherent impossibility defense could be
"silently" manifested through the absence of its application in cases of unreasonable attempts.
But judicial denial of the defense on such grounds would necessarily be a question of fact, not of
law. No evidence exists of a court repudiating the defense as a matter of law.
208. Attorney General v. Sillem, 159 Eng. Rep. 178, 221 (Ex. D. 1863).
209. Id.
210. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770, 770 (Mass. 1897) (emphasis added).
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means are both absolutely and apparently inadequate, then the
attempt does not exist." 211 In addition, a Virginia court reasoned in
1931: "[I]t is sufficient to say that, if the instrumentalities adopted
were apparently suitable for the consummation of the crime, that is
enough. If they were manifestly insufficient, then this prosecution
is at an end."21 Since these cases, the defense of inherent impossi-
bility has been recognized, if not always applied, by many state and
federal courts.
213
Many state legislatures have joined the judiciary in deciding
that inherently impossible attempts should not be punished. For
example, the Minnesota legislature provided a defense to a defen-
dant who made an impossible attempt if "such impossibility would
have been clearly evident to a person of normal understanding.2'
'
Other legislatures followed Minnesota's lead, agreeing that "inher-
ent impossibility ([for example,] attempt[ing] to kill by witchcraft
such as repeatedly stabbing a cloth dummy made to represent the
person intended to be killed) is . . . a defense."215 Most notably, the
American Law Institute endorsed the doctrine of inherent impossi-
bility in its Model Penal Code. Although the Institute abolished the
211. Dahlberg v. People, 80 N.E. 310, 311 (111. 1907) (holding that an attempt to blind a
person by throwing red pepper into their eyes was an inherently impossible attempt).
212. Trent v. Commonwealth, 156 S.E. 567, 569 (Va. 1931).
213. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 167 A. 344, 348 (Pa. 1933) (" H]exing' with lethal
intent, belongs to the category of'trifles,' with which 'the law is not concerned.' "); see also United
States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d 379, 381 (8th Cir. 1979) (recognizing inherent impossibility as a
defense, but refusing to grant the defense on the facts of the case); United States v. Roman, 356
F. Supp. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (describing inherent impossibility as one of the three types of
impossibilities); Parham v. Commonwealth, 347 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) ("All the
authorities hold that in order to constitute an attempt the act attempted must not be impossible,
but this rule has reference to inherent impossibility. . . ."); State v. Logan, 656 P.2d 777, 779-80
(Kan. 1983) (recognizing that, although the Kansas legislature had abolished legal impossibility
as a defense, the defense of inherent impossibility remained available); People v. Elmore, 261
N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) ("An inherent impossibility is, of course, a defense.'); People
v. Richardson, 207 N.E.2d 453, 456 (Ill. 1965) (suggesting that inherent impossibility, as
distinguished from factual impossibility, is a defense to an attempt charge).
214. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.17(2) (West 1987).
215. JOINT COMM. TO REVISE THE ILL. CRIMINAL CODE, TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT OF THE
PROPOSED ILLINOIS REVISED CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961, 212 (1960). In addition to Illinois, many
other states have codified inherent impossibility doctrine, permitting it either as a full defense or
as a mitigating factor to be used in sentencing. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-103 (1999) ("It
shall not be a defense to a charge of attempt that because of a misapprehension of the
circumstances it would have been impossible for the accused to commit the offense at-
tempted.... An example of inherent impossibility would be an attempt to kill by witchcraft and
is not intended to be excluded as a defense.'); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-206(3) (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06-01(1) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4(b) (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 905(b) (West 1998). But see ALA. CODE § 13A-4-2(b) (1994), GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-
4 (1999), and HAWAII REV. STAT. ANN. § 705-500(1)(a)-(b) (Michie 1999), all declining to adopt the
inherent impossibility section of the Model Penal Code.
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defense of factual and hybrid legal impossibility, the Institute
expressly retained the concept of inherent impossibility. Although
not retained as a defense,216 it was preserved nonetheless by
empowering judges to reduce the defendant's penalty or dismiss the
charges if, in the court's discretion, the "particular conduct [of the
defendant] ... is so inherently unlikely to result or culminate in the
commission of a crime that neither such conduct nor the actor
presents a public danger .... ',217
In addition to courts and legislatures, major criminal law
commentators have recognized the existence of an inherent impos-
sibility defense. For example, Jerome Hall has supported the
defense, arguing that punishment should only follow when the
defendant's actions have created an objective risk of harm.218
Professor Perkins has concurred, stating that "an attempt will not
be recognized if success was obviously impossible-as if an effort is
made to kill another by witchcraft."219 Charles Torcia agrees as
well, stating simply in Wharton's Criminal Law that "case[s] of
obvious impossibility... will not ordinarily be recognized [as
prosecutable attempts]."- While the defense has been criticized as
illogical in some respects,nl commentators who do not openly
support it still recognize it as a valid defense in the law.-
In reviewing the doctrine of impossibility as a whole, it is
clear that attempt defendants are afforded only a very narrow
defense. When a defendant has made a routine miscalculation of
attendant circumstances, as in cases of factual or hybrid legal
impossibility, no defense is available. It is only when a defendant
has made an exceedingly unreasonable miscalculation of circum-
stances as to make the attempt impossible is the defense available.
216. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 102, § 5.01 § 5.01 cmt. 3(b), at 315-16.
217. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 102, § 5.05(2).
218. See HALL, supra note 142, at 591-594.
219. See RONALD M. PERKINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
490 (1957).
220. See TORCIA, supra note 163, § 698, at 632.
221. See WILLIAMS, supra note 145, at 651-53; FLETCHER, supra note 159, at 175-77.




D. Applying the Impossibility Defense to the Positional
Predisposition Inquiry: Defining the Scope of Exculpation
for Inability in Entrapment Cases
Part III of this Note established that independently unable
defendants should be exculpated in entrapment cases. This Part
then undertook the task of defining the appropriate parameters of
"unable." Part IV.A began this task by defining the purpose of the
impossibility defense. By showing that the entrapment and
impossibility defenses have similar purposes, this section demon-
strated that the impossiblity defense can fairly inform a determina-
tion of the limits of exculpation for inability in entrapment cases.
Parts IV.B and IV.C then undertook an extensive explanation of the
three categories of impossibility, concluding that impossibility is
available as a defense only in a very narrow category of cases:
inherently impossible attempts. This Section now applies the
impossibility doctrine to the positional predisposition question to
define the scope of exculpation for inability in entrapment cases.
The inability of a defendant in an entrapment case should be
exculpatory inasmuch as the inability would warrant an impossi-
bility defense in cases of criminal attempt for the same crime. As
made clear above, an inability to complete a crime is only exculpa-
tory in attempt cares when the defendant has acted extremely
unreasonably in making an impossible attempt. Thus, defendants
in entrapment cases unable to independently complete their crime
should only be exonerated when their independent attempt at the
same crime could be characterized as an inherently impossible
attempt.2m
This rule has one drawback that relates to the peculiar cir-
cumstances surrounding the entrapment of unable defendants. To
illustrate, consider the example of a willing, but unable, counter-
feiter of currency. Such a person, if unable to undertake the
complex process of counterfeiting, is no threat to counterfeit on her
own. But after being approached and coached by the government,
such a person may develop the ability to commit the crime. Thus,
to release such a defendant because she did not have the independ-
223. Because the exculpation of the defendant hinges on the inherent impossibility
defense, it is conceivable that exculpation could vary according to jurisdiction, depending on
which jurisdiction offers the defense. Nonetheless, such variance is likely to be slight, if at all.
There is no record of any court rejecting the inherent impossibility defense as a matter of law,
and most jurisdictions only lack precedent due to the uncommon factual nature of the cases.
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ent ability to commit the crime when approached by the govern-
ment would be to release a very willing, and now able, defendant.
This drawback, however, is de minimis at most. As has al-
ready been explained, the number of instances in which an attempt
can be classified as an inherently impossible attempt is extremely
small.- 4 An exhaustive computer and digest search produces only a
handful of cases which even consider the inherent impossibility
defense, much less grant it. Smaller still is the number of inher-
ently impossible attempters who will actually become fully compe-
tent in the abilities needed to commit their crime. To have the
government coach you through a complicated counterfeiting scheme
does not, a priori, mean that you will garner enough ability to
commit the crime on your own. Of course, a very few may, during
their entrapment experience, progress from idiot to expert. The
disutility of exculpating such defendants, however, is far out-
weighed by the utility of consistently punishing the many clumsy
but less-than-ridiculously-unable defendants.
Thus, the complete rule on the exculpation of entrapment de-
fendants for inability should be: a defendant claiming entrapment
shall be exculpated if, viewing the defendant's inability in an
attempt context, a defense of inherent impossibility would be
available.
E. A Fresh View of Hollingsworth Under the Impossibility Approach
This Section covers two matters. First, it attempts to recon-
cile the positional predisposition standard applied in Hollingsworth
with the rule proffered in this Note. This reconciliation reveals
that the Hollingsworth standard is consistent with principles of
inherent impossibility. However, the analysis also reveals that the
court faltered by failing to enunciate the specific parameters of
exculpation for inability that the inherent impossibility rule
dictates in such cases. Second, this Section will reevaluate the
Hollingsworth case under the standard presented in this Note.
This evaluation reveals that Pickard and Hollingsworth belong in
jail.
Although the court did not in any way allude to the inherent
impossibility concept, it is clear that the court was unconsciously
applying a similar standard. In the opinion, Judge Posner stated
224. See supra notes 184-99 and accompanying text.
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that the case should not be "understood as holding that lack of
present means to commit a crime is alone enough to establish
entrapment if the government supplies the means."- Rather,
government inducement should only "affect[ ] the timing of the
offense," not the actuality of the offense's commission.- As an
example, Posner suggested that, had a government agent offered a
boat dealer's address to a criminal looking to commit a crime with a
boat, the defendant would have no entrapment claim based on
positional predisposition because the agent merely altered the
timing of the offense, not the actuality of its commission.-
These explanations from the case suggest that the Seventh
Circuit recognized, albeit unconsciously, the distinction between
factual impossibility and inherent impossibility discussed in this
Note. Similar to the standard advocated in Part IV, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that a case of simple factual impossibility would
not be grounds for exoneration.- On the other hand, because the
court exonerated these two defendants because of their egregious
level of inability ("Pickard and Hollingsworth had no prayer of
becoming money launderers . . . ."), the court implicitly recognized
that the inherent impossibility of independent completion is
exculpatory.
Despite its acceptance of inherent impossibility principles,
the Hollingsworth court nonetheless failed to enunciate a standard
that comported with the precise parameters of the inherent impos-
sibility defense. As this Note has belabored, a defense of inherent
impossibility is available only when the means selected for the
attempt are ludicrously insufficient from the viewpoint of a reason-
able person. In comparison to this rule, the Hollingsworth court
promulgated a rule of considerable less clarity: the defendant is
predisposed if "it is likely that if the government had not induced
him.. ., some criminal would have done so .... = This statement
necessarily implies that a defendant is not predisposed if she was
unlikely to be induced by other criminals to commit the crime. But
the inherent impossibility defense is not available to those who
merely make "unlikely" attempts; it is available only for attempts
225. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1202 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
226. Id. at 1203.
227. See id. at 1202-03.
228. "[L]ack of present means to commit a crime is [not] enough to establish entrapment if
the government supplies the means." Id. at 1202.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1200. (emphasis added).
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that are patently ludicrous-again, the example of the witch doctor
is exemplary. Thus, although the Hollingsworth court captured the
spirit if the inherent impossibility test, it failed to properly enunci-
ate it.
Had the court explicitly relied on the test I have proposed, it
is likely that Pickard and Hollingsworth would have been found
guilty. Most would agree that the two "tyros" would have been
unlikely players in the international money laundering business.
But the succinct question is not the unlikeliness of their success,
but the unreasonableness of their attempt-an unreasonableness
that, according to inherent impossibility law, must rise to the level
of absurdity. While I have never met the two defendants, I find it
implausible that their independent attempt at money laundering
would have been an inherently impossible attempt. Pickard and
Hollingsworth knew enough to open an international bank;21 they
knew how to "clean and polish" money;22 and they knew how to set
up discreet meetings and screen for undercover police.23 Clearly,
these two possessed abilities more effectual than a BB gun-wielding
battleship stalker.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Supreme Court precedent on entrapment is volu-
minous, it does not speak to the positional predisposition issue.
Thus, a determination of the issue's merits can be made only
through analogizing to other, more settled, areas of criminal law.
Accordingly, this Note reviewed relevant criminal law doctrines,
such as the act requirement and the impossibility defense.
Because the entrapment defense is designed to sort out de-
fendants who are not culpable from those who are, any factor that
sheds light on a defendant's culpability is useful to the court. Few
factors could be more definitive of culpability than a defendant's
ability to commit a crime, for without it, the actus reus requirement
cannot be satisfied. Thus, courts hearing entrapment cases are
justified in evaluating the ability of the defendant.
In addition, by analogizing to the impossibility defense, the
scope of exculpation for inability can be clarified. The impossibility
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 1201.
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defense is a proper paradigm because, not only does it sometimes
provide exculpation for inability, but it also does so for the same
reasons that the entrapment defense does. The state of impossibil-
ity law thus suggests that exculpation for inability should be
limited to only those cases in which the defendant would have an
inherent impossibility defense in an attempt case.
John F. Preis*
* My parents deserve special thanks for their constant predisposition to help me.
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